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Arbitration agreements coupled with class-action waivers and other onerous 
provisions have become common in employment, consumer, and other transac-
tions. The Supreme Court’s decisions enforcing such agreements have encour-
aged their use. Scholars have largely critiqued the Court’s decisions.  
This article finds that the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence has not been so 
monolithic. Rather it has evolved through three phases. In Phase I, the Court 
overruled older case law and held that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statu-
tory claims were enforceable pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). 
The Court’s rationale was that as long as the claimant could effectively vindicate 
the claims in the arbitral forum, the arbitration agreement did not amount to a 
waiver of the statutory rights at issue. This rationale led many to envision arbi-
tration, with procedures effectively policed by the courts, developing into an in-
formal, cost-effective forum that would be more accessible than the courts, par-
ticularly for low-dollar-value claims. Phase II substantially undermined the 
effective vindication doctrine, but state contract law doctrines used to police 
overreaching adhesive contracts continued to support the vision of arbitration as 
an accessible forum. In Phase III, however, the Court has held that the FAA 
mandates enforcement of class-action waivers, premising its holding on an FAA 
policy of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms. This article 
demonstrates how the latest phase of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence is 
obliterating state contract-law doctrines that policed overreaching by dominant 
parties, elevating the interests of the parties imposing the terms, and enshrining 
the imposing party’s interests in the FAA and the Supremacy Clause of the Con-
stitution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 “Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice” screamed the head-
line of the opening article of a three-part series in the New York Times in Octo-
ber 2015.1 The article decried the insertion of arbitration clauses coupled with 
class and collective-action waivers and other onerous terms in the boilerplate of 
consumer and employment contracts.2 We do not need the New York Times to 
tell us about the pervasiveness of such provisions. It is close to impossible to 
obtain a credit card, cell phone service, or consumer financing without one.3 
Nursing homes also have largely adopted the practice of mandating that resi-
dents and their caregivers agree to arbitrate any claims that might arise and to 
do so on an individual basis only.4 Employers are increasingly mandating that 
their employees waive their rights to sue and agree to arbitrate their claims on 
an individual basis only.5 
1  Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck 
of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/deal 
book/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5GV 
T-A2J2].
2  Id. 
3  See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
§ 1028(a), at § 2 (2015).
4  See Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Pivotal Nursing Home Suit Raises a 
Simple Question: Who Signed the Contract?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2016), http://www.ny 
times.com/2016/02/22/business/dealbook/pivotal-nursing-home-suit-raises-a-simple-ques 
tion-who-signed-the-contract.html [https://perma.cc/WM38-TXC5]. 
5  See Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Man-
datory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310 
n.9 (2015) (reporting on a recent survey of corporate general counsel which found that the
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Academic scholars have largely criticized the move toward allowing em-
ployers, merchants, and others with superior bargaining power to relegate the 
weaker party of the transaction to arbitration on an individual basis only.6 A 
limited number of legislative and administrative actions have banned mandato-
ry arbitration provisions in certain contexts. For example, the Military Lending 
Act of 2006 prohibits pre-dispute arbitration mandates in consumer credit 
agreements with active military or their dependents but excludes residential 
mortgages and auto loans.7 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act prohibits pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate under the statute’s 
securities and commodities whistleblower-protection provisions.8 The 2010 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act bans defense contractors with De-
partment of Defense (“DoD”) business of $1 million or more from mandating 
arbitration of sexual-harassment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 or in tort.9 On July 31, 2014, President Obama issued an Executive Or-
der extending that ban to all federal contractors with contracts of $1 million or 
more and to all Title VII claims as well as sexual-harassment tort claims.10 Per-
haps the most far-reaching development is the Consumer Finance Protection 
Bureau’s (“CFPB”) proposed regulation that would ban mandatory arbitration 
provisions in consumer financial contracts from precluding class-action law-
suits.11  
 The trend toward individual arbitration of consumer, employment, and 
similar disputes has been encouraged by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, 
which over the last four decades has overwhelmingly favored the party seeking 
to arbitrate. In only two of the numerous cases concerning enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements during this period has the Court favored the party resisting 
arbitration.12 The Court appears to consistently compel weaker parties to arbi-
                                                                                                                                 
use of arbitration mandates with class-action prohibitions increased from 16.1 percent in 
2012 to 42.7 percent in 2014). 
6  See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Em-
ployment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 76 (2014); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: 
The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 
124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2862–63 (2015); Sternlight, supra note 4, at 1325–27; Imre Stephen 
Szalai, More Than Class Action Killers: The Impact of Concepcion and American Express 
on Employment Arbitration, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 31, 51 (2014). 
7  John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (codified as 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006)). 
8  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(1)(2)
(2010)).
9  Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 
Stat. 3409, 3454–55 (2009). 
10  Exec. Order No. 13673, § 6, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014). 
11  Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32830-
01 (proposed May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1040). 
12  Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 (2002) 
(holding that EEOC may sue employer for individual relief for victims of discrimination de-
spite arbitration provision in victims’ employment contracts); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of 
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trate under whatever terms the stronger party imposed on them. Indeed, Profes-
sors Sullivan and Glynn have satirized the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence 
with a supposed serendipitously discovered draft Supreme Court opinion im-
plying an arbitration agreement into every contract that does not expressly dis-
claim arbitration.13 
But the law of adhesive arbitration agreements did not have to develop this 
way. Although at first glance the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence ap-
pears to be monolithic, closer scrutiny reveals that it has evolved and may be 
divided into three phases. In the first phase, the Court rejected older decisions, 
which had refused to enforce pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory 
claims. The Court reasoned that an agreement to arbitrate merely substitutes an 
arbitral for a judicial forum, and as long as the arbitral forum allows for the ef-
fective vindication of statutory rights, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate do 
not amount to impermissible waivers of statutory rights. Although many schol-
ars criticized the privatization of the adjudication of statutory claims, others, 
including this author, seized on the requirement that the claimant be able to ef-
fectively vindicate the claim in the arbitral forum as a vehicle for close judicial 
regulation of the arbitration process. Such judicial policing would allow arbitra-
tion to develop into a faster and more accessible option for claimants, albeit one 
lacking the possibility of outlier jury awards.14 In the second phase, the Court 
placed a heavy burden on the party resisting arbitration to prove that the arbitral 
forum precluded the vindication of statutory claims. Although that burden un-
dermined the vision of judicial policing to ensure that arbitration would be a 
fair, accessible forum, the possibility of some judicial policing under the effec-
tive vindication doctrine remained and was buttressed by state contract law 
which contains tools for protecting the weaker party to a transaction from over-
reaching by the stronger party.15 The third, and most recent, phase emphasizes a 
federal policy that arbitration agreements be enforced “according to their 
terms.”16 This federal policy has completely neutered the effective vindication 
doctrine and is on its way to obliterating state contract law through federal 
preemption. Phase III has shattered the vision of arbitration as a viable, acces-
sible forum for weaker claimants.17 
 This article traces and evaluates the three phases of the Supreme Court’s 
arbitration jurisprudence. Part I chronicles the three phases of the Court’s arbi-
Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470 (1989) (holding that the Federal Ar-
bitration Act does not preempt California law that allows state trial court judges to stay arbi-
tration while related claims against entities not party to arbitration agreements proceed in 
court). 
13  Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Satire, The FAA Triumphal: A Modest Opinion, 
19 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 103 (2015). 
14  See discussion infra Part I.A. 
15  See discussion infra Part I.B. 
16  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
17  See discussion infra Part I.C. 
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tration jurisprudence, tracing its evolution from reliance on the view that arbi-
tration will be compelled as long as the aggrieved party may effectively vindi-
cate statutory claims in the arbitral forum to the current approach, which relies 
on a federal policy favoring enforcement of the arbitration agreement in ac-
cordance with its terms. Part II examines consequences of the Court’s third 
phase. It finds that the new emphasis on a policy favoring enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements in accordance with their terms coupled with the federal poli-
cy favoring arbitration by resolving ambiguities in favor of arbitration threatens 
to obliterate basic doctrines of state contract law designed to protect the weaker 
party in grossly one-sided transactions. Part III reflects on the apparent demise 
of such state contract-law doctrines. It concludes that the Court’s arbitration ju-
risprudence has focused only on the concerns of the business imposing the arbi-
tration agreement in complete disregard of the presence of a second, weaker 
party to the transaction. 
I. THE THREE PHASES
 Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that written 
provisions in contracts evidencing transactions involving commerce to arbitrate 
claims arising out of such transactions “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
able, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.”18 However, in Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court held that a pre-
dispute agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 was un-
enforceable.19 The Court relied on Section 14 of the Securities Act which de-
clared void “[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person ac-
quiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this 
[subchapter] . . .”20 The Court reasoned: 
Even though the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to the buy-
er, apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in arbitration as compared 
to judicial proceedings. Determination of the quality of a commodity or the 
amount of money due under a contract is not the type of issue here involved. 
This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an al-
leged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but applied by the 
arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law. As their award may be made 
without explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their pro-
ceedings, the arbitrators’ conception of the legal meaning of such statutory re-
quirements as “burden of proof,” “reasonable care” or “material fact,” . . . can-
not be examined. Power to vacate an award is limited. . . . As the protective 
provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly 
18  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
19  Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434–35 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
20  Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 112-106, § 14, 48 Stat. 84 (1933) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 77n). 
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assure their effectiveness, it seems to us that Congress must have intended § 14 
. . . to apply to waiver of judicial trial and review.21 
Beginning in the 1970s, however, the Court moved away from this view 
that statutory provisions expressly prohibiting waiver of rights protected by the 
statute preclude pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate such claims. This Part 
chronicles the evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence from a view that an 
agreement to arbitrate changes the forum but does not affect substantive statu-
tory rights as long as those rights may be effectively vindicated in the arbitral 
forum to its current view that the FAA embodies a strong federal policy that 
such agreements be enforced in accordance with their terms. 
A. Phase I: Substitution of Forum and Effective Vindication
The Supreme Court’s movement away from Wilko began in international
commercial contracts, such as in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. Decided in 
1974, the Court in Scherk, by a vote of five to four, enforced an arbitration pro-
vision in a contract between a United States corporation and a German citizen 
concerning the sale of European business entities, and it required Alberto-
Culver to arbitrate its claims under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.22 
The Court assumed that under Wilko, such claims in a purely domestic context 
might not be arbitrable23 but found Wilko inapplicable to the international 
transaction before it. The Court reasoned: 
An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a special-
ized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also 
the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute. The invalidation of such an 
agreement in the case before us would not only allow the respondent to repudi-
ate its solemn promise but would, as well, reflect a parochial concept that all 
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . . We cannot have 
trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on 
our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.24 
 Eleven years later, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., the Court confronted a federal statutory claim pertaining to another inter-
national transaction that included an arbitration provision.25 Soler, a Chrysler 
and Mitsubishi dealer in Puerto Rico, sought to litigate its Sherman Act anti-
trust claim against Mitsubishi, a Japanese auto manufacturer, despite a provi-
sion in its distributor agreement requiring arbitration in Japan under the rules of 
the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.26 The Court followed Scherk 
and held the Sherman Act claim arbitrable.27 It rejected the view that requiring 
21  Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435–37 (citations omitted). 
22  Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 506, 519–20 (1974). 
23  Id. at 515. 
24  Id. at 519 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). 
25  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616 (1985). 
26  Id. at 616–17. 
27  See id. at 630–37. 
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arbitration, at least in the international context, would undermine the public 
policies underlying the Sherman Act: 
There is no reason to assume at the outset of the dispute that international 
arbitration will not provide an adequate mechanism. To be sure, the international 
arbitral tribunal owes no prior allegiance to the legal norms of particular states; 
hence, it has no direct obligation to vindicate their statutory dictates. The tribu-
nal, however, is bound to effectuate the intentions of the parties. Where the par-
ties have agreed that the arbitral body is to decide a defined set of claims which 
includes, as in these cases, those arising from the application of American anti-
trust law, the tribunal therefore should be bound to decide that dispute in accord 
with the national law giving rise to the claim. And so long as the prospective lit-
igant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, 
the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.28  
 It did not take the Court long to expand to purely domestic transactions; the 
 concept that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate will be enforced with respect to 
statutory claims as long as the party may effectively vindicate those rights in 
the arbitral forum. The stage was set for such expansion a few months prior to 
Mitsubishi in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.29 The Court in Byrd, as did 
the lower courts before it, assumed that claims under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 were governed by Wilko and, thus, not arbitrable.30 The Court nev-
ertheless held that state-law claims pended to the Securities and Exchange Act 
lawsuit were arbitrable, and the FAA compelled the lower court to order them 
arbitrated.31 In a concurring opinion, Justice White emphasized that arbitrability 
of claims under the 1934 act was an open question.32 
 Two years later, the Court held that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate 
were enforceable as applied to claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, as well as to claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (“RICO”).33 Relying on Mitsubishi, the Court held that the FAA 
mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims unless the 
party opposing arbitration can establish that Congress intended to preclude 
waiver of the judicial forum.34 Relying further on Mitsubishi, the Court held 
that there was no reason to believe that the claimants could not effectively vin-
dicate their statutory claims in the arbitral forum; thus, the arbitration agree-
ment did not amount to a waiver of statutory rights but simply provided for 
“their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”35 The same ra-
tionale led the Court a year later to overrule Wilko36 and two years thereafter to 
28  Id. at 636–37 (citation omitted). 
29  Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
30  Id. at 215 n.1. 
31  Id. at 217. 
32  Id. at 224–25 (White, J., concurring). 
33  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987). 
34  Id. at 226–27. 
35  Id. at 229–30. 
36  Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
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extend its holding to employment statutes in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp.37 
 The Court’s rationale that an agreement to arbitrate did not waive substan-
tive statutory rights but merely substituted the arbitral forum for the judicial fo-
rum for adjudication of those rights as long as the aggrieved party could effec-
tively vindicate those rights in arbitration led lower courts to police arbitration 
procedures to ensure effective vindication. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Cole 
v. Burns International Security Services contains one of the most extensive and
scholarly discussions of the minimum characteristics of an arbitration system
necessary to provide an employee with a forum in which to vindicate effective-
ly a statutory claim.38 The decision received considerable attention, not only for
its thoroughness but also because its author, Chief Judge Harry Edwards, is a
leading scholar in alternative dispute resolution and the law governing the
workplace. The court in Cole held that the arbitration system must provide neu-
tral arbitrators, “more than minimal discovery,” “a written award,” and “all of
the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court,” and the system
must “not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitra-
tors’ fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.”39
The Court’s Phase I jurisprudence enforcing pre-dispute agreements to ar-
bitrate statutory claims came under intense scholarly criticism.40 A number of 
scholars and commentators, however, suggested, particularly in the employ-
ment arena, that mandatory arbitration could provide an accessible, fair process 
for workers to resolve claims that might not otherwise be litigated. In one of the 
earliest analyses, Professor Susan A. FitzGibbon, taking note of the develop-
ments in Cole and observing that the remedy of reinstatement becomes less 
workable the more time that passes between termination and reinstatement, ar-
gued that with procedures properly policed by courts and arbitration profes-
sionals, arbitration could provide an accessible and speedy forum in which the 
remedy of reinstatement could be viable.41 Professor Roberto L. Corrada argued 
that properly policed by courts and market forces, including an active plaintiffs’ 
bar, employer-mandated arbitration could provide a forum for lower income 
37  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
38  Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
39  Id. at 1482 (emphasis in original). 
40  See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived” and Lost 
in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381 (1996); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration 
of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking 
the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The 
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996). 
41  Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 221, 
249 (1997). 
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employees, for whom the courts were not accessible, and urged civil rights 
lawyers to work actively to shape the arbitration process.42 
Professor Robert N. Covington envisioned employment arbitration evolv-
ing into a U.S. system of labor courts.43 Individual employee rights advocate, 
Lewis L. Maltby, urged that arbitration could provide an affordable and acces-
sible forum to rank-and-file employees for whom the prospect of litigation is 
more of a mirage than a reality.44 I suggested that a key advantage to employers 
of mandating arbitration was eliminating their exposure to outlier jury awards 
and that such advantage would be balanced by the advantage to employees of 
an accessible forum in which dismissals and summary judgments were rare, 
provided that the arbitral process was adequately policed.45 More recently, Pro-
fessor Theodore J. St. Antoine reiterated the potential of mandatory employ-
ment arbitration as a more accessible forum for low-income workers and others 
with low-dollar-value claims over litigation46 and suggested that some employ-
ers, prior to Phase III discussed below, were moving away from imposing arbi-
tration mandates for that reason.47 
 The Court’s approach in Phase I that premised the enforceability of pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory claims on the agreement’s merely 
changing the forum without waiving substantive rights provided the basis for 
decisions such as Cole, setting forth general prerequisites for the arbitral forum 
being deemed one in which statutory rights may be effectively vindicated. De-
cisions such as Cole prompted many to envision mandatory arbitration, at least 
in the employment setting, evolving into an accessible, speedy forum with sig-
nificant advantages for employees as well as employers. Unfortunately, that vi-
sion was significantly undermined as the Court’s jurisprudence evolved into 
Phase II. 
42  Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer’s Impact and 
Legacy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1051, 1068–70 (1996). 
43  Robert N. Covington, Employment Arbitration After Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come to 
the United States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345, 351 (1998). 
44  Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 63 (1998). 
45  Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice But By How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not An-
swer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 589, 607–09 (2001). 
46  Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better than It Looks, 41 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 783, 810 (2008). 
47  Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the Past Quarter 
Century, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 411, 421 (2010); see also Charles D. Coleman, Is 
Mandatory Employment Arbitration Living up to Its Expectations? A View from the Employ-
er’s Perspective, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 238 (2010) (Raytheon Company senior 
counsel reporting that the company discontinued its mandatory employment arbitration pro-
gram because of the absence of appeals and rarity of dismissals and summary judgments). 
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B. Phase II: The Party Opposing Arbitration Must Prove Inability to
Vindicate
Phase II is marked by Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, where the
Court placed a significant gloss on Phase I.48 For pre-dispute agreements to ar-
bitrate to be enforceable, the claimant must still be able to effectively vindicate 
statutory rights in the arbitral forum.49 There is a presumption, however, that 
the forum allows for such vindication, and the party resisting arbitration has a 
heavy burden to demonstrate otherwise.50 
 In Randolph, the plaintiff financed her purchase of a mobile home through 
Green Tree Financial Corp. (“Green Tree”), whose financing agreement re-
quired arbitration for all disputes related to the agreement.51 Randolph sued 
Green Tree alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act and the Equal Cred-
it Opportunity Act.52 Green Tree moved to compel arbitration, and the district 
court agreed.53 However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, observing that the arbi-
tration agreement failed to specify which party would be responsible for the ar-
bitrator’s fees and related costs of the proceeding.54 The court held the agree-
ment unenforceable because it subjected the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of 
steep arbitration costs that would undermine her ability effectively to vindicate 
her statutory rights.55 
 By a five to four vote, the Supreme Court reversed.56 The majority wrote: 
It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a 
litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory 
rights in the arbitral forum. But the record does not show that Randolph will 
bear such costs if she goes to arbitration. Indeed, it contains hardly any infor-
mation on the matter. As the Court of Appeals recognized, “we lack . . . infor-
mation about how claimants fare under Green Tree’s arbitration clause.” The 
record reveals only the arbitration agreement’s silence on the subject, and that 
fact alone is plainly insufficient to render it unenforceable. The “risk” that Ran-
dolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the in-
validation of an arbitration agreement.57 
 The Court premised its analysis on the strong federal policy favoring arbi-
tration. It analogized to the presumption that claims under a particular statute 
are arbitrable unless the party resisting arbitration shows that Congress intend-
48  Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
49  Id. at 90. 
50  Id. at 91–92. 
51  See id. at 82–83. 
52  Id. at 83. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. at 84. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. at 81. 
57  Id. at 90–91 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). 
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ed that claim under the statute not be arbitrated.58 The Court placed a similar 
burden on a party resisting arbitration on the ground that excessive costs will 
impede her ability to vindicate her claims in the arbitral forum.59 The Court ma-
jority wrote: 
[T]he party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at is-
sue are unsuitable for arbitration. We have held that the party seeking to avoid
arbitration bears the burden of establishing that Congress intended to preclude
arbitration of the statutory claims at issue. Similarly, we believe that where, as
here, a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbi-
tration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing
the likelihood of incurring such costs. Randolph did not meet that burden.60
 The decision in Randolph requiring case-by-case adjudication of the effects 
of the costs of the arbitral forum on a plaintiff’s ability to vindicate statutory 
rights is in marked contrast to Cole’s bright-line rule that the employer (or in 
Randolph, the creditor) must pay all arbitral fees above an amount equal to a 
federal court filing fee.61 The decision in Cole told employers, and by implica-
tion, banks, merchants, and others who would impose arbitration in adhesive 
contracts, to provide that claimants pay only a nominal amount of forum costs 
if they want their arbitration agreements enforced.62 Cole’s rule, thus, was 
largely self-enforcing as employers and others had to provide in their arbitra-
tion plans for claimants to pay only nominal fees. In contrast, Randolph effec-
tively mandated pre-arbitration litigation over fee allocation. The prospect of 
costly and uncertain litigation likely deters many claimants from challenging a 
plan’s allocation of arbitral fees even where the prospect of incurring large fees 
deters them from bringing their claims to arbitration.63 
 Randolph assumed that the decision of whether a plaintiff proved that a 
provision of an arbitration agreement impeded the plaintiff’s ability to vindicate 
statutory rights in the arbitral forum would be made by the court. Subsequently 
during Phase II, in PacifiCare Health Systems v. Book, the Court began signal-
58  Id. at 91–92. 
59  Id. at 92. 
60  Id. at 91–92 (citations omitted). 
61  See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
62  See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing that the system must “not require 
employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrator’s fees or expenses as a condi-
tion of access”) (quoting Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 
1997)); see also Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484–85 (“[F]ees would be prohibitively expensive for an 
employee like Cole, especially after being fired from his job, and it is unacceptable to re-
quire Cole to pay arbitrators’ fees, because such fees are unlike anything that he would have 
to pay to pursue his statutory claims in court.” Thus, the court held “that Cole could not be 
required to agree to arbitrate his public law claims as a condition of employment if the arbi-
tration agreement required him to pay all or part of the arbitrator’s fees and expenses.”). 
63  See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer 
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 75, 100–01 (2004) (making a similar point with respect to case-by-case adjudication 
of validity of class-action prohibitions in consumer arbitration agreements). 
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ing lower courts to refer to arbitrators’ questions concerning the adequacy of an 
arbitral forum to vindicate statutory rights.64 
In PacifiCare, a group of physicians sued several managed-care organiza-
tions alleging that the managed-care organizations violated, inter alia, RICO.65 
The managed-care organizations moved to compel arbitration.66 Their contracts 
with the physicians required arbitration but also provided “punitive damages 
shall not be awarded,” or “[t]he arbitrators . . . shall have no authority to award 
any punitive or exemplary damages,” or “[t]he arbitrators . . . shall have no au-
thority to award extra contractual damages of any kind, including punitive or 
exemplary damages.”67 The lower courts refused to enforce the arbitration 
agreements because they precluded the plaintiffs from being awarded treble 
damages, as provided for in RICO.68 
The Supreme Court reversed.69 The Court observed that it had on several 
occasions commented that statutory treble damages in general, and RICO’s tre-
ble-damage provision in particular, serve remedial as well as punitive func-
tions.70 The Court characterized the contracts’ limitations on the arbitrator’s 
remedial authority as “ambiguous,” and reasoned, “[W]e should not, on the ba-
sis of ‘mere speculation’ that an arbitrator might interpret these ambiguous 
agreements in a manner that casts their enforceability into doubt, take upon 
ourselves the authority to decide the antecedent question of how the ambiguity 
is to be resolved.”71 The Court held that the lower courts should have com-
pelled arbitration.72 
 To resolve the issue of arbitral remedial authority, the arbitrator would, by 
necessity, have to decide whether RICO treble damages are punitive or com-
pensatory. Significantly, the Court did not hold that RICO treble damages are 
not punitive in nature. It merely observed that in prior decisions, it had charac-
terized various statutory treble-damage provisions as serving remedial as well 
as punitive functions.73 Thus, the Court left it to the arbitrator in PacifiCare to 
interpret RICO in the context of the arbitration agreements’ limitations on arbi-
tral remedial authority. Furthermore, if the arbitrator determined that the 
agreement precluded an award of treble damages, the arbitrator would have to 
decide whether such a prospective waiver of treble damages is allowed under 
RICO. 
64  PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003). 
65  Id. at 402. 
66  Id. at 403. 
67  Id. at 405. 
68  Id. at 403. 
69  Id. at 407. 
70  Id. at 405–06. 
71  Id. at 406–07. 
72  Id. at 407. 
73  Id. at 405–06. 
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 The combined effect of Randolph and PacifiCare was not lost on then-
Circuit Judge John Roberts who wrote: 
We take from these recent cases two basic propositions: first, that the party 
resisting arbitration on the ground that the terms of an arbitration agreement in-
terfere with the effective vindication of statutory rights bears the burden of 
showing the likelihood of such interference, and second, that this burden cannot 
be carried by “mere speculation” about how an arbitrator “might” interpret or 
apply the agreement.74 
 Thus, in Phase II, the Court continued to adhere to its rationale that pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate merely substitute the arbitral forum for the judi-
cial as long as the forum allows for the effective vindication of statutory rights 
but made it very difficult for courts to police the forum. Nevertheless, the po-
tential for judicial supervision of the forum remained, albeit in a much smaller 
subset of cases.75 
Moreover, Phase II left state contract law relatively unscathed. Because the 
FAA expressly leaves arbitration agreements subject to “such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,”76 in Phase II, it was ac-
cepted that “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements,”77 in 
contrast to “state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions,” which are 
preempted by the FAA.78 
A wealth of state law has developed policing the one-sidedness of adhesive 
contracts. State contract doctrine calls for interpreting ambiguous language 
against the drafter and finding hidden provisions not to be part of the contract.79 
By far the most far-reaching contract-law-policing doctrine is unconscionabil-
ity.80 
74  Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
75  See, e.g., McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 487 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding an em-
ployer’s control over the pool of potential arbitrators rendered the arbitral forum incapable of 
providing for effective vindication of plaintiff’s statutory rights); Floss v. Ryan’s Family 
Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2000) (suggesting similar concerns in dicta). 
But see Lyster v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 239 F.3d 943, 947–48 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(refusing to invalidate a suspect arbitrator selection provision on the ground that plaintiff did 
not meet the burden of showing an inability to effectively vindicate statutory rights in an ar-
bitral forum); see also Penn v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 
2001) (refusing to enforce an agreement to arbitrate because of a lack of consideration, but 
suggesting that an attack on arbitrator selection procedure would not meet the burden under 
Randolph). 
76  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
77  Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
78  Id. 
79  See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26 (3d ed. 2004). 
80  For example, the doctrine is codified in the Uniform Commercial Code’s provisions gov-
erning contracts for the sale of goods, see U.C.C. § 2-302 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N & AM. LAW
INST., amended 2003), and is recognized in the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the 
Law of Contracts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 2016). 
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In Armandariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.,81 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court incorporated the Cole requirements into state law.82 The 
court further found that an arbitration agreement that limited remedies and re-
quired only the weaker party to arbitrate while leaving the imposing party free 
to go to court was substantively unconscionable.83 Other courts found substan-
tively unconscionable—and therefore unenforceable—arbitration agreement 
provisions that have limited the time period during which the claim could be 
filed,84 limited the remedies available to the claimant,85 and imposed excessive 
arbitration costs on the claimant.86 Although state unconscionability law had its 
drawbacks,87 the use of state contract law coupled with what remained of the 
effective vindication doctrine allowed the vision of strictly policed arbitral pro-
cesses providing claimants access to justice to remain viable. Phase III, howev-
er, calls judicial supervision into serious question and shatters the vision. 
C. Phase III: The Federal Policy Favoring Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements in Accordance with Their Terms
 Phase III is marked by the Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion88 and American Express Corp. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.89 The 
Court’s new rationale for compelling arbitration of statutory claims is that 
“courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, 
including terms that specify with whom the parties choose to arbitrate their dis-
putes, and the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.”90 The new 
rationale came front and center in Concepcion, where it was essential to the 
Court’s holding that the FAA preempted the California law of unconscionabil-
ity. 
 The Concepcions purchased cell phone service from AT&T, which was 
advertised as including free phones, but AT&T charged them sales tax based on 
the phones’ retail values.91 They brought a class action for false advertising and 
fraud.92 Because their contract mandated arbitration on an individual basis and 
81  Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). 
82  Id. at 681–89. 
83  Id. at 691–94. 
84  Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying Virgin Is-
lands’ law). 
85  Id.; Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 767 (Wash. 2004) (en banc); see 
also Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (limita-
tions on remedies coupled with class-action waiver unconscionable). 
86  Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594, 607–08 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
87  See Martin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment Arbitration: The State of the Law and 
the Need for Self-Regulation, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 363, 380–85 (2007). 
88  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
89  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
90  Id. at 2309 (emphasis omitted) (quotations omitted) (citations omitted) (brackets omitted). 
91  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337. 
92  Id. 
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precluded class actions, AT&T moved to compel arbitration, but the lower 
courts denied the motion finding that the limitations on class actions was un-
conscionable under California law.93 Under California law, class-action waivers 
in consumer contracts—where potential claims are likely to be too small to liti-
gate individually—are unconscionable regardless of whether they are included 
in arbitration agreements or are free standing.94 Section 2 of the FAA allows for 
the refusal to enforce arbitration agreements on such grounds that exist at law 
or in equity for denying enforcement to any contract.95 Although California 
held class-action waivers unconscionable independently of whether they were 
found in arbitration agreements,96 the Court held that the FAA preempted Cali-
fornia law when the class-action waiver is in an arbitration agreement.97 
 The Court founded the preemption on its declaration that “[t]he overarch-
ing purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facili-
tate streamlined proceedings.”98 The Court went on to criticize class actions in 
arbitration as inconsistent with the speed, informality, and simplicity of arbitra-
tion as envisioned by the FAA.99 
In Italian Colors, Italian Colors and other merchants who accepted Ameri-
can Express cards brought a class action alleging American Express used its 
monopoly power to compel merchants to pay excessive fees for transactions 
with the cards.100 Their agreements with American Express mandated arbitra-
tion and prohibited class actions.101 When American Express moved to compel 
arbitration, the plaintiffs responded with an economist’s affidavit, which main-
tained that the cost of expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims 
would range in six or seven figures while the maximum recovery for an indi-
vidual plaintiff after trebling the damages would be $38,549.102 The Second 
Circuit held the class-action waiver unenforceable, finding that the plaintiffs 
93  Id. at 337–38. 
94  See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346–48. 
95  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
96  See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338 (quoting the Ninth Circuit in Laster v. AT&T Mobility 
LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2009), to the effect that the Discover Bank rule was 
“simply a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in 
California[] . . . [and] placed arbitration agreements with class action waivers on the exact 
same footing as contracts that bar class action litigation outside the context of arbitration.”) 
(emphasis omitted) (quotations omitted) (citation omitted). 
97  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (discussing preemption of California law). 
98  Id. at 344. 
99  Id. at 348–51. 
100  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013). 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
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would incur prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate individually.103 The Su-
preme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of its decision 
in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,104 which had held that 
an arbitrator lacked authority to order arbitration on a class-wide basis unless 
such authority was conferred on the arbitrator by the parties’ agreement.105 On 
remand, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its decision.106 After the Supreme Court 
ruled in Concepcion that the FAA preempted California state law, which had 
held that class-action waivers in consumer contracts were unconscionable, the 
Second Circuit sua sponte reconsidered and reaffirmed its decision.107 
The Supreme Court reversed.108 The Court majority, which included Chief 
Justice Roberts, characterized the effective vindication line of analysis from 
Phases I and II as dicta.109 It upheld the arbitration mandate with its class-action 
waiver, reasoning that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in 
proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to 
pursue that remedy.”110 But the Court went further. It suggested that it might 
uphold a provision which precluded a party from presenting economic testimo-
ny, even in an antitrust case.111 The driving rationale behind the Court’s deci-
sion was that “courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according 
to their terms, including terms that specify with whom the parties choose to ar-
bitrate their disputes, and the rules under which that arbitration will be con-
ducted.”112 
For many years, the Court told us that the FAA’s “purpose was to reverse 
the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at 
English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place 
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”113 The newly 
found purpose of enforcing arbitration agreements in accordance with their 
terms places them on a different footing from other contracts by making them 
immune to being struck or reformed under generally applicable contract doc-
103  Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. (In re Am. Express Mer-
chants’ Litig.), 554 F.3d 300, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2401 
(2010). 
104  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010) (mem.). 
105  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). 
106  Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co.  (In re Am. Express Mer-
chants’ Litig.), 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011). 
107  Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. (In re Am. Express Mer-
chants’ Litig.), 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
108  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
109  Id. at 2310. 
110  Id. at 2311 (emphasis in original). 
111  Id. at 2311 n.3. 
112  Id. at 2309 (emphasis omitted) (quotations omitted) (citations omitted) (brackets omit-
ted). 
113  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (citing Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–20, 220 n.6 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 
417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974)). 
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trine. Without this freshly found purpose of the FAA, the Court would have had 
no basis for holding the generally applicable state contract law of unconsciona-
bility preempted by the FAA.114 
 In Italian Colors, the Court used this freshly found purpose of the FAA to 
obliterate the well-established principle that arbitration merely changes the fo-
rum in which statutory rights may be vindicated. Indeed, the Court no longer 
spoke of arbitration as a forum in which rights may be vindicated but now 
spoke of it as a forum in which an aggrieved party may pursue statutory reme-
dies.115 It does not matter that the arbitration system is set up in such a way as 
to make the pursuit a fool’s errand. 
The Phase III rationale for compelling arbitration, which no longer asks 
whether arbitration merely changes the forum in which statutory claims will be 
resolved but now vigorously enforces arbitration agreements in accordance 
with their terms, raises numerous issues going forward. The next section ex-
plores the most significant ones. 
II. GOING FORWARD IN PHASE III
A. Determining the Terms of the Arbitration Agreement
Giving effect to a federal policy of rigorously enforcing arbitration agree-
ments according to their terms begs the question of how to determine the terms. 
Suddenly, the Court’s decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercu-
ry Construction Corp.116 may loom large. The hospital’s construction contract 
with Mercury provided for arbitration of disputes.117 Mercury demanded pay-
ment of certain claims from the hospital, which filed an action in state court for 
a declaratory judgment that it was not required to arbitrate.118 Mercury re-
sponded by filing a diversity action in federal court seeking to compel arbitra-
tion under the FAA.119 At issue was whether the federal court should stay its 
proceeding pending the outcome of the state court action.120 In holding that the 
federal court need not stay its proceeding,121 the Supreme Court catalogued the 
factors that militated against the stay, including that 
114  As Professor Aragaki has observed, in Concepcion, the Court extended its jurisprudence 
calling for rigorous enforcement of the parties’ contract over whether and what substantive 
claims should be arbitrated, for the first time, to mandate rigorous enforcement of the par-
ties’ contractual choice of what procedures will apply in arbitration. Hiro N. Aragaki, The 
Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 1956 (2014). That 
extension substantially undermines judicial efforts to police procedures in arbitration, such 
as called for in cases like Cole. 
115  Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11. 
116  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
117  Id. at 4–5. 
118  Id. at 7. 
119  Id. 
120  See id. at 13. 
121  See id. at 19. 
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[t]he basic issue presented in Mercury’s federal suit was the arbitrability of
the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital. Federal law in the terms of the 
Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state or federal court. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any 
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract lan-
guage itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.122 
Phase I of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence featured a heavy presump-
tion that statutory claims are arbitrable but left courts considerable leeway to 
police arbitration procedures. Phase II greatly limited that policing, thus in-
creasing the weight on the scale in favor of compelling arbitration and deregu-
lating the process. Phase III, by potentially obliterating the effective vindication 
doctrine and greatly restricting state unconscionability law, furthers that dereg-
ulation and again increases the weight on the compelling arbitration side of the 
scale. Moses H. Cone did not concern whether the claims were arbitrable, but 
the Court’s language in finding that the federal court need not stay its hand 
pending the outcome of the state case, coupled with Phase III’s increased 
weight on compelling arbitration, provides a one-two punch that can be read to 
support ignoring basic state law principles of contract interpretation to compel 
arbitration even in the most doubtful circumstances. A comparison of pre- and 
post-Phase III cases suggests this may already be happening. 
Two decisions from the Tenth Circuit reflect this concern. In Dumais v. 
American Golf Corp., a pre-Phase III decision, the arbitration provision was 
part of an employee handbook.123 At one place in the handbook, the employer 
reserved the right to change anything at will except for the arbitration provision 
and a provision that employment was at-will.124 At another place, the employer 
reserved the right to change anything except the at-will employment provi-
sion.125 The handbook, thus, was ambiguous as to whether the employer had 
reserved the right to change the arbitration provision at-will. The court cited the 
state common-law doctrine of interpreting contracts against the drafter.126 It ob-
served that the doctrine pointed in different directions for resolving the ambigu-
ity in the handbook: 
In the unusual posture of this case, the issue becomes whether we construe the 
ambiguity against the drafter generally or within the confines of the particular 
litigation before us. If construed generally against American Golf, the ambiguity 
would prohibit American Golf from modifying the arbitration agreement. If we 
construe the ambiguity against American Golf within the specific confines of 
122  Id. at 24–25. 
123  Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002). 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. at 1219. 
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this dispute, the ambiguity would permit modification of the arbitration agree-
ment because such a construction would enable Appellee to avoid arbitration.127 
The court opted for the latter interpretation.128 It found that because the 
employer reserved the right to change the arbitration provision at-will, the arbi-
tration provision was illusory and hence unenforceable.129 The court held that 
arbitration should not be compelled.130 
In Sanchez v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC,131 decided during Phase III, the 
court compelled arbitration of the plaintiffs’ FLSA overtime claims under a 
clause providing that “[a]ny dispute, difference or unresolved question between 
Nitro-Lift and the Employee . . . shall be settled by arbitration . . .”132 The pro-
vision was in an agreement not to compete which also referenced sections 4, 
4(k), and 18 of the agreement—sections that did not exist.133 The court found 
the arbitration clause ambiguous but did not resolve the ambiguity in accord-
ance with ordinary principles of contract law (which presumably would include 
interpreting against the drafter). Instead it said that, in accordance with the 
broad presumption of arbitrability, all ambiguities, as a matter of federal law, 
are to be resolved in favor of arbitration: 
In our view, when the broad arbitration clause is considered together with the 
entire language of the narrow contract, two reasonable constructions emerge—
either the parties agreed to arbitrate all disputes arising between them, or they 
agreed to arbitrate all disputes concerning only those issues covered in the 
agreement. We need not decide this difficult question, for we have stated that “to 
acknowledge the ambiguity is to resolve the issue, because all ambiguities must 
be resolved in favor of arbitrability.”134 
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. at 1220. 
131  Sanchez v. Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC, 762 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2014). 
132  Id. at 1142 (emphasis omitted). 
133  Id. at 1142–43. 
134  Id. at 1147. But see Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., No. 14-4966, 2015 WL 4480829, 
at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2015), aff’d, No. 15-2835, 2016 WL 6574075 (3d Cir. Nov. 7, 
2016), where an exotic dancer worked at a club since 2006 and sued claiming what the club 
styled as a lease arrangement whereby she leased space in the club to perform was really an 
employment relationship and she was entitled to minimum wage and overtime. She signed a 
lease agreement in 2013 that included an arbitration clause. Id. at *1. The defendant could 
not produce any prior signed agreement but showed its standard packet in use at the time in-
cluded a lease agreement with an arbitration clause and that it had lost most of its documents 
in a 2009 flood. Id. at *3. The court applied the Pennsylvania lost document doctrine, which 
required proof by clear and convincing evidence and found that the defendant didn’t meet its 
burden of proof. Id. The court also interpreted the 2013 agreement to not encompass claims 
prior to date of its signing. Id. at *4.  The club appealed arguing that the district court erred 
in applying the lost document doctrine and in refusing to apply the 2013 agreement retroac-
tively. In an unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit declined to address these issues. 2016 
WL 6574075 at *3 n.14. The court held that the arbitration clause, which applied to disputes 
arising out of the lease agreement, did not encompass claims under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act and related state statutes and affirmed the district court on this basis. Id. at *2. 
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 In its most recent decision in Phase III, DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, the Su-
preme Court expanded Concepcion’s preemption of state contract law of un-
conscionability to preempt state law of contract interpretation.135 The plaintiffs 
sued for various consumer protection violations.136 The arbitration agreement 
provided, “[i]f . . . the law of your state would find this agreement to dispense 
with class arbitration procedures unenforceable, then this entire Section 9 [the 
arbitration section] is unenforceable.”137 California law held class-action waiv-
ers unconscionable, but the Supreme Court held that law preempted in Concep-
cion.138 The California Court of Appeal interpreted “law of your state” to in-
clude state law that is federally preempted and held that the matter was not 
arbitrable.139 The court relied on contract doctrines that the specific governs 
over the general and that ambiguities are to be construed against the drafter.140 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding California contract law was 
preempted by the FAA.141 It rejected the state court’s view that the language at 
issue, in particular, the phrase “law of your state,” was ambiguous142 and con-
cluded that the doctrine of interpreting against the drafter did not apply.143 The 
Supreme Court found the California Court of Appeal’s decision in conflict with 
decisions of the California Supreme Court.144 It read the state court’s reasoning 
as indicating that the court would not interpret “law of your state” to include 
invalid state law in any context other than arbitration145 and pointed to the state 
court’s language, which it said focused only on arbitration.146 The Court opined 
that the state court’s view “that state law retains independent force even after it 
has been authoritatively invalidated by this Court is one courts are unlikely to 
accept as a general matter and to apply in other contexts.”147 It criticized the 
state court for invoking no other principle that would suggest that California 
courts would interpret “law of your state” the same way in contexts other than 
arbitration.148 The Supreme Court concluded that the California court’s decision 
did not treat arbitration agreements equally with other contracts but rather was 
driven by there being a contract to arbitrate at issue.149 
135  DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 468 (2015). 
136  Id. at 471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (outlining the alleged violations of California con-
sumer-protective legislation). 
137  Id. at 469 (majority opinion) (quotation omitted). 
138  Id. at 467. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 471. 
142  Id. at 469. 
143  Id. at 470. 
144  Id. at 469. 
145  Id. at 469–70. 
146  Id. at 470. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. at 471. 
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Rather than take the state court’s interpretation of state contract law at face 
value, the Supreme Court set itself up as a type of super-state supreme court to 
find the state court’s application of state contract law preempted by the FAA. 
The decision is in marked contrast to Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board 
of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, a case arising solidly dur-
ing the Phase I period.150 In Volt, the parties’ construction contract adopted 
provisions from a form contract developed by the American Institute of Archi-
tects, including a provision specifying that the contract would be governed by 
the law of the place where the project was located.151 The contract also con-
tained an arbitration clause.152 Volt claimed the university owed it for extra 
work and demanded arbitration.153 The University filed suit in state court for 
fraud and breach of contract against Volt and indemnification against two other 
contractors involved in the project with whom the University did not have arbi-
tration agreements.154 In accordance with state law, the state courts stayed the 
arbitration between the University and Volt pending the outcome of the litiga-
tion against the other contractors.155 The Supreme Court deferred to the state 
court’s interpretation of the choice-of-law clause as including the California 
rules of arbitration, despite the language in Moses H. Cone.156 The Court 
opined, “There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of 
procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, ac-
cording to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.”157 Reiterating that the 
FAA “simply requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to ar-
bitrate, like other contracts,” the Court held that the FAA did not preempt Cali-
fornia law.158 
The contrast between the pre- and post-Phase III decisions of the Tenth 
Circuit and the Supreme Court and their implications for the survival of state 
contract law are stark. Prior to Phase III, the Tenth Circuit employed the tradi-
tional contract doctrine of interpreting ambiguous contract language against the 
drafter, especially when dealing with adhesive contracts. In Phase III, the Tenth 
Circuit displaced traditional contract interpretation tools with a presumption 
resolving ambiguities in favor of arbitration. Prior to Phase III, the Supreme 
Court took the state courts’ interpretations of their own contract law at face 
value, but in DirecTV the Court set itself up as a super-state supreme court, 
preempting the state’s traditional contract doctrine by reinterpreting state law to 
150  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
151  See id. at 479–80 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
152  Id. at 470 (majority opinion). 
153  Id. 
154  Id. at 470–71. 
155  Id. at 471. 
156  Id. at 476. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. at 478–79. 
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conclude that the state had singled out arbitration contracts for discriminatorily 
unfavorable treatment. 
Professor Imre S. Szalai has suggested that DirecTV presumes that any 
state law-contract interpretation against arbitration is based on a discriminatory 
anti-arbitration bias unless the party defending the state court interpretation can 
show that the court interpreted the same phrase in the same way in a non-
arbitration contract setting.159 Professor Szalai has argued that DirecTV will 
lead to any state court interpretation of a contract against arbitration being 
preempted by the FAA.160 
In Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Development Co., condominium purchasers 
sued the condominium developer and related entities.161 The purchase agree-
ment contained a waiver of jury trial and provided that venue for any cause of 
action would lie in the Second Circuit Court in the State of Hawaii.162 In the 
purchase agreement, the buyers acknowledged, approved, and accepted the 
condominium declaration, which on pages thirty-four and thirty-five of the thir-
ty-six total pages mandated arbitration in Honolulu of all claims arising out of 
the declaration.163 The Hawaii Supreme Court found the arbitration provision 
ambiguous in light of its conflict with the venue provision in the purchase 
agreement, construed the ambiguity against the drafter, and held that the claims 
were not arbitrable.164 The Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded 
for reconsideration in light of DirecTV.165 
Phase III, thus, is pushing aside state law of contract interpretation and 
sending a clear message to state courts that they should interpret contracts to 
mandate arbitration or face FAA preemption. But an even larger threat to tradi-
tional state contract law looms in the implications of Phase III for the doctrine 
of unconscionability. The next section explores what, if anything, is left of un-
conscionability law. 
B. What is Left of Unconscionability Law?
The rationale in Concepcion for preempting the California law that class-
action waivers were unconscionable, i.e., the FAA’s strong policy favoring en-
forcing arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms, could potentially 
eradicate the application of unconscionability law to any aspect of an arbitra-
tion agreement. A finding of unconscionability necessarily precludes enforce-
159  Imre S. Szalai, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia: How the Supreme Court Used a Jedi Mind 
Trick to Turn Arbitration Law Upside Down, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 
2016) (manuscript at 22–23) (on file with author). 
160  Id. (manuscript at 31). 
161  Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co., 350 P.3d 995, 998 (Haw. 2015), vacated and remand-
ed by Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co.  v. Narayan, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016). 
162  Id. at 1000. 
163  Id. 
164  Id. at 1003. The court also found the agreement unconscionable. Id. at 1003–06. 
165  Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co. v. Narayan, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016) (mem.). 
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ment of the contract in accordance with its terms, as the court may deny or limit 
enforcement of a contract or any part of a contract that it finds to be uncon-
scionable.166 But unconscionability is a ground that exists in law or equity for 
revocation of any contract and thus appears to be preserved by Section 2 of the 
FAA.167 As the Ninth Circuit noted in a slightly different context, a broad read-
ing of the policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements in accordance 
with their terms “would require strict enforcement of all terms contained in an 
arbitration agreement, including terms that are unenforceable under generally 
applicable state law. Such a broad construction of the FAA’s purposes is unten-
able, of course, because it would render § 2’s saving clause wholly ‘ineffectu-
al.’ ”168 
Two decisions issued shortly after Italian Colors illustrate the divide over 
what, if anything, remains of state unconscionability law. In Reed Elsevier, Inc. 
v. Crockett,169 the arbitration provision in an adhesion contract between Crock-
ett and LexisNexis mandated arbitration in the city where LexisNexis is locat-
ed.170 Crockett had a billing dispute with LexisNexis, but arbitrating individual-
ly under the agreement was economically unfeasible so he filed a demand for
classwide arbitration on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated Lex-
isNexis customers.171 The agreement was silent as to the availability of class-
wide arbitration.172
The court rejected Crockett’s argument that if the agreement was interpret-
ed to preclude classwide arbitration, it would be unconscionable.173 The court 
detailed how one-sided the agreement was but concluded it was bound by Ital-
ian Colors to enforce it.174 It stated that 
[t]he clause is indeed as one-sided as Crockett says: the clause favors LexisNex-
is at every turn, and as a practical matter makes it economically unfeasible for
Crockett or any other customer to assert the individual claims that Crockett
seeks to assert here. The clause provides that any arbitration of any dispute con-
cerning LexisNexis’s charges must occur in Dayton, Ohio, where LexisNexis is
headquartered. The customer must pay his own legal fees, even if the arbitrator
concludes that LexisNexis’s charges were improper. And unlike many corpora-
tions that require arbitration of disputes with their customers, LexisNexis makes
its customer split the tab for the arbitrator’s fee. The idea that the arbitration
agreement in this case reflects the intent of anyone but LexisNexis is the purest
166 U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
167  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) 
(“[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may 
be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements . . .”). 
168  Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 434 (9th Cir. 2015). 
169  Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013). 
170  Id. at 600. 
171  Id. at 596. 
172  Id. at 599. 
173  Id. at 600. 
174  Id. 
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legal fiction. But all of these things—the one-sided nature of the arbitration 
clause, and its adhesive nature—were also present in American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant. And there the Supreme Court held that, all of those 
concerns notwithstanding, the absence of a class-action right does not render an 
arbitration agreement unenforceable. . . . Under Italian Colors, therefore, the 
agreement here is not unconscionable.175 
In contrast, in Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held an arbitration agreement unconscionable under California law and 
that the state law was not preempted by the FAA.176 The agreement at issue 
prohibited the use of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) or Judicial 
Arbitration and Mediation Service as an arbitration administrator.177 It provided 
that if the parties could not agree on an arbitrator, each party would nominate 
three, and the parties would alternate striking names until one remained, with 
the party who did not initiate arbitration making the first strike.178 The agree-
ment effectively guaranteed that Ralphs Grocery would determine who would 
be the arbitrator. It prohibited the arbitrator from awarding the employee attor-
ney fees unless a Supreme Court decision expressly required such an award and 
required the arbitrator to determine at the outset how the arbitrator’s fee would 
be apportioned between the parties.179 It also allowed Ralphs Grocery to amend 
the agreement unilaterally without notice to the employee and stated that con-
tinued employment would signify assent to the new terms.180 Distinguishing 
Italian Colors, the court stated that “[i]n this case, administrative and filing 
costs, even disregarding the cost to prove the merits, effectively foreclose pur-
suit of the claim. Ralphs has constructed an arbitration system that imposes 
non-recoverable costs on employees just to get in the door.”181 It also rejected 
Ralphs argument that the FAA preempted California law, reasoning: 
If state law could not require some level of fairness in an arbitration 
agreement, there would be nothing to stop an employer from imposing an arbi-
tration clause that, for example, made its own president the arbitrator of all 
claims brought by its employees. Federal law favoring arbitration is not a license 
to tilt the arbitration process in favor of the party with more bargaining power. 
California law regarding unconscionable contracts, as applied in this case, is not 
unfavorable towards arbitration, but instead reflects a generally applicable poli-
cy against abuses of bargaining power. The FAA does not preempt its invalida-
tion of Ralphs’ arbitration policy.182 
175  Id. (citation omitted). 
176  Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2013). 
177  Id. at 920. 
178  Id. 
179  Id. at 920–21. 
180  Id. at 921. 
181  Id. at 927. 
182  Id. A provision effectively enabling the employer’s president to preside as arbitrator is 
found in the collective bargaining agreement between the National Football League (“NFL”) 
and the NFL Players Association. Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football 
League Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 537 (2d Cir. 2016). Article 46 of that contract allows 
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 The California Supreme Court has held that the FAA preempts state un-
conscionability law only where it interferes with fundamental attributes of arbi-
tration.183 Courts in California and elsewhere continue to hold arbitration provi-
sions unconscionable in extreme cases. For example, in Carlson v. Home Team 
Pest Defense, Inc., the California Court of Appeal held the arbitration provision 
in an employment contract unconscionable.184 The plaintiff had asked to see the 
arbitration agreement but was told it was not available; despite this, she still 
had to “blindly sign” it or the job offer would be withdrawn, which would re-
sult in plaintiff losing her unemployment benefits.185 The court held the agree-
ment substantively unconscionable because it 1) reserved the employer’s right 
to go to court to enforce restrictive covenants and intellectual property rights; 
2) required the employee to file a request for dispute resolution before demand-
ing arbitration but did not say what dispute resolution procedure was involved;
3) precluded demanding arbitration on any matter not included in the request
for dispute resolution; 4) precluded the employee—but not the employer—from
being represented by counsel; 5) required the arbitration request to be filed
within ninety days after filing the request for dispute resolution; and 6) required
that arbitration fees and expenses be split between the parties.186
the NFL commissioner to discipline a player for conduct detrimental to the integrity of the 
game and provides the player with the right to appeal to the commissioner who appoints a 
hearing officer to hear the appeal. Id. The contract expressly allows the commissioner to ap-
point himself as hearing officer. Id. That is exactly what NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell 
did following the NFL’s investigation of the deflation of the New England Patriots’ footballs 
in the 2015 American Football Conference championship game. Id. at 534. Commissioner 
Goodell imposed a four-game suspension on Patriots’ quarterback Tom Brady, appointed 
himself as hearing officer to hear Brady’s appeal, and upheld the discipline that he had im-
posed. Id. at 534–35. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected Brady’s argument 
that Goodell’s decision be vacated for arbitrator evident partiality. Id. at 548. The Court 
opined: 
[A]rbitration is a matter of contract, and consequently, the parties to an arbitration can ask for no
more impartiality than inheres in the method they have chosen. . . . [T]he parties contracted . . .
to specifically allow the Commissioner to sit as the arbitrator in all disputes brought pursuant to
Article 46, Section 1(a). They did so knowing full well that the Commissioner had the sole pow-
er of determining what constitutes “conduct detrimental,” and thus knowing that the Commis-
sioner would have a stake both in the underlying discipline and in every arbitration brought pur-
suant to Section 1(a). Had the parties wished to restrict the Commissioner’s authority, they could
have fashioned a different agreement.
Id. (citations omitted). The Brady decision arose under a collective bargaining agreement 
between two affluent sophisticated parties of relatively equal bargaining power. It should not 
be applied to contracts of adhesion, but it does illustrate the extremes to which the driving 
rationale of Phase III—enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms—could 
lead. 
183  Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 353 P.3d 741, 750 (Cal. 2015); Sonic-Calabasas 
A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 188 (Cal. 2013). 
184  Carlson v. Home Team Pest Def., Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). 
185  Id. at 35–36. 
186  See id. at 41–42. 
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Unconscionability has been found where plaintiffs were seeking to assert 
that they were employees of the defendants even though their contracts claimed 
they were something else. For example, the Illinois Appellate Court held an ar-
bitration provision unconscionable in contracts between purportedly independ-
ent truck drivers and a trucking company.187 The plaintiffs were truck drivers 
who spoke Russian but not much English and whose contracts with defendant 
stated that they were independent contractors.188 The contract provided for a 
per-mile fee with numerous deductions, which, if the drivers were employees, 
would have been illegal.189 If the drivers wanted to contest a deduction, the 
agreement required filing of an arbitration demand within ten days after the 
date of the deduction.190 A separate arbitration demand was required for each 
deduction.191 The agreement provided that arbitration would take place in Illi-
nois, even though plaintiffs did not live in Illinois and often their routes did not 
take them through Illinois.192 It also provided that each party would select an 
arbitrator, and “if the two arbitrators disagree, those arbitrators would select a 
third, whose fees and expenses would be shared[.]”193 The court held the provi-
sions unconscionable.194 
In Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., the Pennsylvania court found an arbi-
tration provision unconscionable in the plaintiff exotic dancer’s lease of dance 
space from the company she claimed was really her employer.195 The court 
found that a new lease agreement with an arbitration provision, which super-
seded her prior lease with the company, was procedurally unconscionable be-
cause it was given to the exotic dancer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.196 The 
court reasoned that it was given to her after she paid her dance floor fees for the 
night, and, thus, if she took the time to read it, she would be sacrificing dance 
floor-earning time for which she had already paid.197 The court found it sub-
stantively unconscionable for various reasons. First, it waived the plaintiff’s 
FLSA right to recover attorney fees if she prevailed; second, the court inter-
preted its silence concerning availability of class and collective actions to mean 
that they were not available; and third, plaintiff thus entered into an unknowing 
187  Potiyevskiy v. TM Transp., Inc., No. 1-13-1864, 2013 WL 6199949, at *10 (Ill. App. 
Nov. 25, 2013). 
188  Id. at *1–2. 
189  Id. at *1. 
190  Id. at *2. 
191  Id. at *3. 
192  Id. at *8. 
193  Id. at *2. 
194  Id. at *10. 
195  Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., No. 14-4966, 2015 WL 4480829, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 
22, 2015), aff’d on other grounds, No. 15-2835, 2016 WL 6574075 (3d Cir. Nov. 7, 2016). 
196  Id. at *1, *9. 
197  Id. at *9. 
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waiver of that right (distinguishing Concepcion where the waiver was ex-
pressed).198 
But a broad application of the policy favoring enforcement of arbitration 
agreements in accordance with their terms could render decisions like these 
preempted. The Court in Concepcion seemed to lay the groundwork for such 
holdings. It generally linked the enforcement of the terms of the arbitration 
agreement to the type of arbitration the Court maintained that the FAA envi-
sions: 
The point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes 
is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute. It 
can be specified, for example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the rele-
vant field, or that proceedings be kept confidential to protect trade secrets. And 
the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and 
increasing the speed of dispute resolution.199 
 At least one court has read Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph as an 
unconscionability case and has held that the FAA has federalized the law of 
unconscionability.200 And in a different exotic-dancer case, another court found 
that the collective-action waiver, the fee-shifting provision, and the provision 
shortening the statute of limitations were not substantively unconscionable be-
cause they “have a general tendency to reduce the formalities, the delays, the 
expenses, and the vexation associated with ordinary litigation. That is, they fur-
ther the very goals that make arbitration a favored procedure . . .”201 Such a ra-
tionale could easily be used to find state law holding such features substantive-
ly unconscionable to be preempted under Concepcion. 
 Furthermore, the Court’s decisions in Phase III may have a depressing ef-
fect on judicial willingness to find arbitration provisions unconscionable. For 
example, in Hopkinton Drug, Inc. v. CaremarkPCS, LLC, Hopkinton, an inde-
pendent pharmaceutical compounder, sued CaremarkPCS following termina-
tion of its long-standing relationship as a Caremark provider.202 The parties’ 
2011 agreement provided, inter alia, “The arbitrator must follow the rule of 
Law, and may only award remedies provided for in the Provider Agree-
ment.”203 In 2014, pursuant to authority reserved to CaremarkPCS in the 2011 
agreement, CaremarkPCS unilaterally imposed new terms including a class-
198  Id. at *10–11. 
199  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344–45 (2011). 
200  In re Sprint Premium Data Plan Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 11-
2855(SDW)(MCA), 2014 WL 202117, at *1–2 (D. N.J. Jan. 15, 2014); see also Valle v. 
ATM Nat’l, LLC, No. 14-cv-7993(KBF), 2015 WL 413449, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 
2015) (finding loser pays winner’s costs and attorney fees provision unconscionable not be-
cause claimants’ claims for wrongfully charged ATM fees were worth only $300 or $400 
and would be deterred by loser pays provision but because claimants’ very low income ren-
dered the loser pays provision unconscionable under Randolph). 
201  D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 330 (D. Conn. 2011). 
202  Hopkinton Drug, Inc. v. CaremarkPCS, LLC, 77 F. Supp. 3d 237, 240 (D. Mass. 2015). 
203  Id. at 241. 
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action waiver and a provision precluding the arbitrator from awarding indirect, 
consequential, or special damages, lost profits or savings, punitive damages or 
damages for injury to reputation or loss of customers or business.204 But the 
court held that the provision was not unconscionable.205 The court essentially 
left it to the arbitrator to decide the scope of the damage limitation. In its rea-
soning, the court cited the federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration 
agreements in accordance with their terms.206 
Recall the dicta in Italian Colors that the policy favoring enforcing arbitra-
tion agreements in accordance with their terms might lead the Court to uphold a 
provision in the agreement barring the presentation of economic evidence even 
in an antitrust case.207 Such a provision would grossly disadvantage a claimant 
who would bear the burden of proof and would be unable to meet that burden 
without economic evidence. The evidence bar seems qualitatively comparable 
to provisions that courts have held unconscionable, but the Court’s dicta strong-
ly suggests that, to the extent that state law may find such one-sided provisions 
unconscionable, it will be preempted by the FAA policy favoring enforcement 
of arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms.208 
When a court finds a contractual provision unconscionable, under the Re-
statement and the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), it “may refuse to en-
force the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.”209 Accordingly, depending on the 
circumstances, courts have severed unconscionable terms in arbitration agree-
ments, compelling parties to arbitrate without the severed terms.210 In the most 
extreme cases where severing the unconscionable provisions would require the 
court to in effect rewrite the arbitration clause, courts have refused to enforce 
the arbitration agreement in its entirety.211 
The one-two punch of enforcing arbitration agreements in accordance with 
their terms and resolving all ambiguities in favor of arbitration may knock out 
204  Id. at 241–42. 
205  Id. at 247. 
206  See, e.g., id. at 242. 
207  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 n.3 (2013). 
208  See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 310 (Supp. 2015-2) 
(suggesting state court holdings in which discovery limitations in arbitration agreements are 
unconscionable are preempted in light of Concepcion and Italian Colors). 
209 U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (2016 update). 
210  See, e.g., Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J.); 
Scovill v. WSYX/ABC, Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., 425 F.3d 1012, 1016–17 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 674–75 (6th Cir. 2003); Spinetti v. Serv. 
Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 221–23 (3d Cir. 2003); Valle v. ATM Nat’l, LLC, No. 14-cv-
7993(KBF), 2015 WL 413449, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015). 
211  See, e.g., Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 781 (7th Cir. 2014); Carlson v. 
Home Team Pest Def., Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 44–45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015); Potiyevskiy v. 
TM Transp., Inc., No. 1-13-1864, 2013 WL 6199949, at *10 (Ill. App. Nov. 25, 2013). 
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the flexibility that the UCC and Restatement afford judges facing unconsciona-
ble arbitration provisions. In Zaborowski v. MHM Government Services, Inc.,212 
the arbitration provision shortened the limitations period to six months, provid-
ed for the employer to select three arbitrators from which employee would se-
lect one, required a filing fee of $2,600 and provided that if the employer pre-
vailed the employee would be responsible for employer’s costs and attorney 
fees.213 The court held these provisions unconscionable and that the uncon-
scionability was so pervasive that the unconscionable terms could not be sev-
ered without rewriting the contract.214 Consequently, it refused to compel arbi-
tration.215 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the FAA 
preempts California law and compels severing the unconscionable clauses 
while otherwise enforcing the agreement to arbitrate.216 However, the case was 
removed from the Court’s argument calendar and apparently has been set-
tled.217 
The Court’s Phase III arbitration jurisprudence provides three routes to 
compelling courts to reform unconscionable arbitration provisions rather than 
denying enforcement entirely. First, most contracts contain savings clauses 
providing that if a court finds a provision of the contract to be unenforceable, 
then the provision shall be severed, and the remainder will be enforced. In such 
cases, it will be easy to find that the federal policy that arbitration agreements 
be enforced in accordance with their terms preempts the state law that would 
ignore the savings clause. Second, even if the contract is silent as to severance 
of unenforceable provisions and state contract law would find the provision not 
severable, the federal policy requiring that ambiguities be resolved in favor of 
arbitration can again preempt state law, thus mandating the implication of an 
intent that the unenforceable provisions be severed, requiring enforcement of 
the arbitration provision. Third, if the one-two punch of the enforcement of ar-
bitration agreements in accordance with their terms and the resolution of ambi-
guities in favor of arbitration does not compel severance, the court can always 
become a super-state supreme court as it did in DirecTV. In doing so, the Court 
can conclude that the state court rule on severance is peculiar to arbitration 
agreements and would not to be applied generally and is preempted by the 
FAA. 
212  Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs. Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d, 
601 Fed. Appx. 461 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 136. S. Ct. 27 (2015). 
213  Id. at 1153–54. 
214  Id. at 1156–57. 
215  Id. at 1157. 
216  MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. Zaborowski, 136 S. Ct. 1539 (2015) (mem.). 
217  See Ronald Mann, February Argument Calendar Loses Arbitration Case to Settlement, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 7, 2016, 6:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/february-
argument-calendar-loses-arbitration-case-to-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/S2EC-RTAF]. 
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C. Unavailability of the Designated Arbitral Forum
What happens when the designated arbitration-service provider is unavail-
able? This issue is potentially very important because of the effect it can have 
on efforts at self-regulation by private arbitration service providers.218 For ex-
ample, the AAA will refuse to administer arbitration agreements that substan-
tially depart from its rules or the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbi-
tration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment Relationship.219 
 The situation pits two of the driving forces in Phase III against each other. 
The policy that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their terms 
would seem to counsel against enforcing an arbitration agreement that desig-
nates a particular service provider that later becomes unavailable. But a court 
could find the agreement ambiguous concerning the parties’ intent if the desig-
nated service provider becomes unavailable, and the policy of resolving ambi-
guities in favor of arbitration would counsel in favor of compelling arbitration. 
The latter policy appears to be reinforced by section 5 of the FAA, which pro-
vides for the court to appoint an arbitrator when 1) the agreement fails to desig-
nate a method for making the appointment, 2) a party fails to avail itself of the 
agreement’s method, or 3) there is a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator.220 The 
most significant Phase III cases have arisen from consumer contracts naming 
the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) as arbitrator or providing for arbitra-
tion to be conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Nation. 
NAF was an arbitration services provider frequently named in consumer 
contracts. It became unavailable in 2009 after being sued by the Minnesota At-
torney General, following her investigation, which showed that NAF represent-
ed to corporations that it would appoint anti-consumer arbitrators and would 
refuse to refer further cases to arbitrators who ruled in favor of consumers.221 
NAF resolved the lawsuit by agreeing to cease conducting consumer arbitra-
tions.222 In Khan v. Dell, Inc., Khan’s agreement accompanying the computer 
he purchased from Dell provided “ANY CLAIM, DISPUTE, OR 
CONTROVERSY . . . SHALL BE RESOLVED EXCLUSIVELY AND 
FINALLY BY BINDING ARBITRATION ADMINISTERED BY THE 
218  See Malin, supra note 87, at 396, 399–400 (discussing need for providers of arbitration 
services to police the procedural fairness of employer-imposed arbitration mandates because 
of inadequacy of judicial policing). 
219  See, e.g., Brady v. Williams Capital Grp., L.P., 928 N.E.2d 383, 385 (N.Y. 2010) (refus-
ing to defer to AAA’s insistence that employer pay the entire arbitrator fee where the arbitra-
tion agreement was imposed by the employer as a condition of employment); see also NAT’L 
ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, Guidelines for Standards of Professional Responsibility for Arbitra-
tors in Mandatory Employment Arbitration, http://naarb.org/Guidelines_for_standards.asp 
[https://perma.cc/K2AR-7CPJ] (last visited July 17, 2016) (providing guidelines for mem-
bers of the National Academy of Arbitrators to follow in deciding whether to accept and 
conduct employment arbitrations). 
220  9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012). 
221  See Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 358–59 (3d Cir. 2012) (Sloviter, J., dissenting). 
222  See id. (Sloviter, J., dissenting). 
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NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM . . .”223 A divided Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals compelled arbitration with the court to appoint a substitute arbitra-
tor under section 5 of the FAA.224 The majority held that whether section 5 ap-
plied turned on whether naming NAF as arbitrator was an integral part of the 
agreement.225 Although dissenting Judge Sloviter believed the contract’s lan-
guage clearly and unambiguously mandated arbitration before NAF and no one 
else,226 the majority reasoned that the provision was ambiguous because the 
word “exclusively” could be read as modifying only “binding arbitration” ra-
ther than “administered by NAF” or “binding arbitration administered by 
NAF.”227 The majority reasoned, “[b]ecause of the ambiguity, it is not clear 
whether the designation of NAF is ancillary or is as important a consideration 
as the agreement to arbitrate itself. Therefore, we must resolve this ambiguity 
in favor of arbitration.”228 The majority’s reasoning echoed the reasoning of the 
Tenth Circuit in Sanchez v. Nitro-Lift.229 Both opinions did not attempt to re-
solve ambiguous contract language with common contract principles, such as 
interpreting against the drafter. Instead, they simply found, or the dissent in 
Khan might say manufactured, ambiguity and compelled arbitration.230 
The Seventh Circuit went a step further, again by a divided vote, in Green 
v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC.231 Green’s payday loan agreement, entered
into three years after NAF agreed to stop handling consumer arbitrations,232
mandated arbitration by one arbitrator “by and under the Code of Procedure of
the National Arbitration Forum.”233 The majority read section 5 as precluding
application of the integral part of the agreement doctrine.234 It reasoned that
section 5
tells us that arbitration clauses remain enforceable if for “any” reason there is a 
“lapse in the naming of an arbitrator”. When a court declares that one or another 
part of an arbitration clause is “integral” and that the clause is therefore unen-
forceable as a matter of federal common law, it is effectively disagreeing with 
223  Id. at 351 (majority opinion) (capitals in original). 
224  Id. at 356–57. 
225  Id. at 356. 
226  Id. at 357 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). 
227  Id. at 358. 
228  Id. at 356 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). But see Rivera v. 
Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803, 811–15 (N.M. 2011) (holding that designation of 
NAF as arbitrator was an integral part of the arbitration agreement and its unavailability pre-
cluded compelling arbitration). 
229  See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text. 
230  Khan, 669 F.3d at 358 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). 
231  Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013). 
232  See id. at 789. 
233  Id. at 794 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
234  Id. at 791 (majority opinion). 
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Congress, which provided that a judge can appoint an arbitrator when for “any” 
reason something has gone wrong.235 
 The Cheyenne River Sioux Nation cases all involved very high-interest 
consumer loan agreements. In Inetianbor v. Cashcall, Inc., the agreement pro-
vided for arbitration “conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by 
an authorized representative in accordance with its consumer dispute 
rules . . .”236 The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation had no consumer dispute 
arbitration rules and did not conduct arbitrations.237 The court held that the des-
ignated arbitral forum was an integral part of the arbitration agreement and, be-
cause the forum was unavailable, the agreement was unenforceable.238  
 In Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC,239 the Seventh Circuit distinguished 
its prior decision in Green. The plaintiffs took out loans over the internet from 
the defendant, an LLC controlled by an individual who was a member of the 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and resided on the Tribe’s reservation in South 
Dakota.240 The loans carried annual interest rates of 139 percent.241 The plain-
tiffs brought suit under Illinois usury and consumer fraud laws.242 The loan 
agreements provided that claims “will be resolved by Arbitration, which shall 
be conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by an authorized rep-
resentative in accordance with its consumer dispute rules and the terms of this 
Agreement.”243 The loan agreements further provided that arbitration would be 
conducted by either “(i) a Tribal Elder, or (ii) a panel of three (3) members of 
the Tribal Council.”244 The loan agreements also provided “that the Loan Enti-
ties [would] pay the filing fee and any fees charged by the arbitrator; the loan 
consumer [would] not have to travel to the reservation for arbitration; and the 
loan consumer [could] participate in arbitration by phone or videoconfer-
ence.”245 The court distinguished Green from the case before it on several 
grounds. No tribal elders were qualified to serve as arbitrators. The tribe had no 
arbitration rules or procedures.246 In another case, the tribe had appointed a 
tribal elder whose daughter worked for the defendant, and the appointment was 
a subjective judgment with no rules governing appointment of the arbitrator.247  
235  Id. 
236  Inetianbor v. Cashcall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2014). 
237  Id. at 1348–49, 1354. 
238  Id. at 1350–54. 
239  Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2014). 
240  Id. at 768–69. 
241  Id. at 769. 
242  Id. 
243  Id. 
244  Id. 
245  Id. 
246  Id. at 778. 
247  Id. at 770–71. 
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The court said: 
In Green, we noted that, if the particular arbitration clause before us had 
been shorn of all detail as to the number of arbitrators, the identity of the arbitra-
tors or the rules that the arbitrators were to employ, the mere existence of the ar-
bitration clause would have made it clear that the parties still would have pre-
ferred to submit their dispute to arbitration.  
Although such mutuality of intent might have been apparent in the con-
tractual relationship in Green, it is not at all apparent in the situation before us 
today. The contract at issue here contains a very atypical and carefully crafted 
arbitration clause designed to lull the loan consumer into believing that, alt-
hough any dispute would be subject to an arbitration proceeding in a distant fo-
rum, that proceeding nevertheless would be under the aegis of a public body and 
conducted under procedural rules approved by that body. The parties might have 
chosen arbitration even if they could not have had the arbitrator whom they had 
specified or even if the rules to which they had stipulated were not available. But 
even if these circumstances had been tolerable, a far more basic infirmity would 
have remained: One party, namely the loan consumer, would have been left 
without a basic protection and essential part of his bargain—the auspices of a 
public entity of tribal governance.248 
 The Cheyenne Sioux loan sharks, however, appeared to have gotten the 
message from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. In Hayes v. Delbert Services 
Corp., the trial court compelled arbitration of claims relating to another 139 
percent interest rate loan from an entity located on Cheyenne River Indian Res-
ervation.249 The loan had the same arbitration clause as in Jackson but also pro-
vided with respect to selection of the arbitrator that the borrower could opt for 
AAA, JAMS, or any other provider mutually agreed on.250 But the loan sharks’ 
agreement also precluded the arbitrator from applying federal or state law and 
mandated that the case be resolved according to the law of the Cheyenne River 
Sioux.251 The Fourth Circuit held this provision unconscionable, refused to en-
force the arbitration agreement, and reversed the trial court.252 
D. Public Interests and Other Statutes
 Beyond its impact on traditional rules of contract law, Phase III of the
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence has been implicated in three additional areas: 
1) California’s Broughton-Cruz rule; 2) California’s Private Attorney General
Act (“PAGA”); and 3) interpretation of sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act. To the extent the law in these areas precludes enforce-
ment of the arbitration agreement, it runs smack into the Court’s Phase III ju-
risprudence. Thus far, the Court’s emphasis on enforcing arbitration agree-
248  Id. at 781 (citations omitted). 
249  Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp., No. 3:14-cv-258, 2015 WL 269483, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 
21, 2015), rev’d, 811 F.3d 666 (2016). 
250  Id. at *3–4. 
251  Hayes v. Delbert Servs. Corp., 811 F.3d 666, 670 (4th Cir. 2016). 
252  Id. at 673–76. 
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ments in accordance with their terms has played a prominent role in two of the 
three. 
The Broughton-Cruz rule was named after two California Supreme Court 
cases, Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California and Cruz v. PacifiCare 
Health System, Inc., whose holdings provided that arbitration could not be re-
quired where the injunctive remedy sought under state statutes operated for the 
public benefit.253 In Ferguson v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
reversed a California district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration 
for injunctive relief under the Broughton-Cruz rule.254 The court noted that 
Concepcion and Italian Colors stood for the proposition that there can be no 
inherent conflict analysis between the FAA and state statutes because any con-
flicting state law is preempted by the FAA.255 Nor, the court opined, could a 
defense to a motion to compel arbitration rely on the argument that arbitration 
interfered with the effective vindication of a state statutory right because the 
effective vindication requirement applied only to federal statutes.256 
 The court applied Concepcion to preempt any state rule that outright pro-
hibits any particular type of claim (or relief) from arbitration, even if the rule 
derived from a judicial determination that a state statute allowed for injunctive 
relief that had a public purpose.257 The Ferguson decision analogized injunctive 
relief to the “social exemplary” feature of punitive damages to address public 
wrongs.258 Since the U.S. Supreme Court previously held the FAA preempted 
state rules exempting punitive damages from arbitration even though they may 
have a public purpose, the Ferguson court reasoned this applied to the public 
purpose of injunctive relief as well.259 
Concepcion made clear that the principle purpose of the FAA is to ensure 
“private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms,”260 and 
thus a party to an agreement might contract to waive punitive damages that 
would flow directly to her. Ferguson, however, extends that analysis to bind to 
the authority of the arbitrator non-parties to the arbitration agreement, such as 
the state or the general public benefitting from injunctive relief. 
 Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”) claims have fared better thus far. 
In Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, the California Supreme 
Court held that “aggrieved employees” act as a proxy for the state labor agency 
253  Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1159 (Cal. 2003); Broughton v. Cigna 
Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 76 (Cal. 1999). 
254  Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 2013). 
255  Id. at 934–36. 
256  Id. at 936. 
257  Id. at 935. 
258  Id. 
259  Id. 
260  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
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when bringing a PAGA action261 because 75 percent of the remedy for a suc-
cessful claim goes to the agency.262 Since the FAA promotes enforcing private 
dispute resolution agreements, the court reasoned, a rule barring enforcement of 
arbitration of PAGA claims is not inconsistent with the purposes of the FAA 
and is a proper exercise of a state’s police powers.263 The Ninth Circuit has ob-
served that the Iskanian court did not advocate a preference for a judicial forum 
over an arbitral forum for PAGA claims and that there was no demonstration 
that arbitration of PAGA claims would prove complex, cumbersome, time-
consuming, or expensive in frustration of the purpose of the FAA.264 
 In Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc., the Ninth Circuit by 
two-to-one vote held that the FAA does not preempt Iskanian even though the 
contract expressly waived the plaintiffs’ right to bring a PAGA action.265 The 
court did not find the Supreme Court’s discovery of a preference for enforcing 
arbitration agreements according to their terms controlling: 
We recognize that Sakkab and Luxottica likely expected the waiver of repre-
sentative PAGA claims to be enforced, and that the Iskanian rule prevents that 
expectation from being fulfilled. Any generally applicable state law that invali-
dates a mutually agreed upon term of an arbitration agreement will, by defini-
tion, defeat the parties’ contractual expectations. However, the FAA’s saving 
clause clearly indicates that Congress did not intend for the parties’ expectations 
to trump any and all other interests. As we have explained, a rule requiring that 
the parties’ expectations be enforced in all circumstances, regardless of whether 
doing so conflicts with generally applicable state law, would render the saving 
clause wholly ineffectual.266 
 The National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) analysis that employer-
mandated class-action waivers violate section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act (“NLRA”) by interfering with employees’ rights under section 7 to 
engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection has received mixed 
reviews in the courts of appeals. In D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, a divided Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the NLRB’s holding that a class or 
collective action waiver imposed by an employer as a condition of employment 
violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.267 The NLRB held that the waiver inter-
fered with, restrained, or coerced employees in the exercise of their right under 
section 7 of the NLRA to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and pro-
tection.268 The Fifth Circuit majority recognized that the NLRB’s holding that 
section 7 protected the employees’ right to sue collectively to improve their 
261  Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 146–47 (Cal. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 1155 (2015).
262  Id. at 146. 
263  See id. at 148. 
264  Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 434–38 (9th Cir. 2015). 
265  Id. at 427. 
266  Id. at 437. 
267 D.R. Horton, Inc., v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 348, 364 (5th Cir. 2013).
268 See id. at 349.
58 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:23 
working conditions was supported by NLRB and court authority.269 But, relying 
heavily on Concepcion and the Court’s determination that the FAA favors en-
forcing arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms, the majority con-
cluded that section 7 of the NLRA must yield to the conflicting policies of the 
FAA.270  
Judge Graves dissented from the majority’s view that the NLRA must yield 
to conflicting policies of the FAA.271 He agreed with the NLRB that the pur-
pose of the FAA was to ensure that arbitration agreements are treated as favor-
ably as other contracts and argued that holding, in effect, that an arbitration 
agreement is not subject to the NLRA treats the arbitration agreement more fa-
vorably than other contracts.272 He also agreed with the NLRB that the class-
action waiver amounted to a waiver of a substantive NLRA right to engage in 
concerted activity through legal action and thus was not subordinate to the 
FAA.273 Notably absent from Judge Graves’ dissent was any mention of an 
FAA purpose of enforcing arbitration agreements in accordance with their 
terms. 
In Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit declined to follow D.R. Horton and instead held that a class-action waiver 
imposed as a condition of employment violates the NLRA.274 The court, with 
reasoning comparable to Judge Graves’ dissent in D.R. Horton, observed that 
the FAA was designed to treat arbitration agreements like all other contracts 
and not to elevate them over other types of contracts by immunizing them from 
being declared illegal.275 As with Judge Graves’ dissent, at this point nowhere 
does the Seventh Circuit discuss the federal policy articulated in Concepcion 
and Italian Colors that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their 
terms. 
III. THE APPARENT DEMISE OF STATE CONTRACT DOCTRINE AND THE
SHATTERING OF THE ACCESSIBLE FORUM VISION 
The one-two punch of rigorously enforcing arbitration agreements in ac-
cordance with their terms and resolving all ambiguities in favor of arbitration 
derive from cases, Volt and Moses H. Cone, which involved commercial trans-
actions between sophisticated parties.276 Most contentious arbitration issues of 
recent decades, however, have arisen out of contracts of adhesion where 
269  Id. at 356–57. 
270  Id. at 359–60. 
271  Id. at 364 (Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
272  Id. at 364–65 . 
273  Id. at 365. 
274  Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1151, 1157–58 (7th Cir. 2016), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 16-285 (U.S. Sept. 2, 2016). 
275  Id. at 1158–59. 
276  See generally Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468 (1989); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
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stronger parties have imposed terms on parties with little bargaining power. It 
is precisely in such situations that state contract-law doctrines, such as inter-
preting ambiguous language against the drafter and unconscionability, have 
arisen to police gross overreaching. 
 As developed previously, Phase I of the Supreme Court’s arbitration juris-
prudence emphasized that as long as claimants can effectively vindicate their 
statutory rights in the arbitral forum, agreements that mandate arbitration are 
merely a substitution of forum and not a waiver of substantive statutory rights. 
The effective vindication doctrine inspired a vision that judicially policed arbi-
tration mandates could provide a win-win for all parties to the arbitration 
agreement. Such mandates would insulate the stronger party—imposing the 
agreement from the risk of outlier jury awards—while providing the weaker 
party on whom the agreement was imposed with a speedy, efficient, and less 
formal forum that would be more accessible than litigation, particularly for 
low-dollar-value claims. 
 Phase II of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence substantially weakened the 
effective vindication doctrine but left intact state contract law doctrines that 
protect the parties on whom adhesive contract terms are imposed from over-
reaching by the imposing party. Phase III, however, has nailed the lid on the 
coffin of the effective vindication doctrine and emasculated state contract law 
doctrines, such as interpretation against the drafter and unconscionability. By 
tearing down these firewalls against the abuse of superior bargaining power, 
Phase III’s one-two punch serves to elevate the interests of the stronger party 
imposing the terms and enshrine them in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion. 
 This result is not surprising. If the FAA encompasses a federal policy that 
arbitration agreements be enforced according to their terms, in the context of 
consumer, employment, and similar adhesive contracts, it is speaking to the 
terms imposed by the stronger party. This was not lost on Justice Scalia, writ-
ing in Concepcion. He made it clear that it was the cell phone company’s inter-
ests that he viewed the FAA as protecting. The Court catalogued deficiencies in 
arbitration as a forum for handling class actions in a manner that I have charac-
terized as analogous to the deficiencies of arbitration as a forum for handling 
statutory claims in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,277 which the Court now 
views as long discredited.278 The Court concluded, “We find it hard to believe 
that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of review, and 
even harder to believe that Congress would have intended to allow state courts 
to force such a decision.”279 
277  Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 39, 56–57 (1974). 
278  Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or 
Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289, 309 (2012). 
279  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011). 
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 But a class-action waiver can act as a license to steal.280 Consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical: A credit card issuer decides to increase its profits by add-
ing a $1.00 charge to every card holder’s monthly bill. The bill does not ex-
pressly show the extra charge. It just gets added to the total due. I suspect that 
most credit card holders do not check their issuer’s addition when they get their 
monthly statements. The card issuer, of course, is counting on that. Even if 
some card holders notice and complain, the issuer can simply claim that there 
was a computer error and refund the $1.00 while keeping the hundreds of thou-
sands—potentially millions—of other dollars it took in at the expense of less 
vigilant customers. And if a card holder notices that the same computer error is 
made every month, the card holder’s sole recourse is to bring an individual 
claim in arbitration for each dollar discrepancy. The only realistic way to attack 
the theft is with a class action, but after Concepcion, that measure is unavaila-
ble as a matter of federal law because the Court is certain that the issuer would 
not bet the company with no effective means of review. Nowhere did the Court 
even consider, much less express concern with, whether the card holder would 
have consented to giving the issuer such a license to steal.281 That concern, 
which would lie at the heart of state contract law doctrines that police such ad-
hesive contracts, is now preempted by the FAA, even though the Court in 
Phase III has never expressly considered whether Congress intended to pre-
clude a state from stopping such a theft. The Court’s sole concern was with the 
perspective of the credit card issuer, cell phone company, and employer—the 
party with the bargaining power to impose whatever terms it wishes on the 
weaker party. 
 Phase I of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence allowed for effective judi-
cial policing of imposed arbitration terms to ensure that arbitration provided a 
fair and accessible forum for claimants in addition to providing benefits for far 
more powerful respondents. Phase II made such policing more difficult, but po-
licing remained doable. Phase III, however, has obliterated the effective vindi-
cation doctrine and seems well on its way to obliterating state contract doc-
trines that protect weaker parties in adhesion relationships. To borrow Justice 
Ginsburg’s words, Phase III has developed the law “in a manner most protec-
tive of the drafting enterprise.”282 It has largely shattered the vision of imposed 
arbitration procedures, effectively policed, so that they truly provide accessible 
fora advantageous to all parties. After Phase III, to the extent that this vision 
280  See Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to 
Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 705 (2012) (quoting consumer class action attorney who stated 
that Concepcion “opens the door for companies to pickpocket $10 at a time from millions of 
consumers.”). 
281  There is strong empirical evidence that consumers do not understand that they are waiv-
ing their rights to litigate and to participate in class actions and do not understand that courts 
will enforce such waivers. See generally Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little Contracts” with 
Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitra-
tion Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
282  DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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remains, it does so in spite of, rather than assisted by, the evolving legal doc-
trine of the Supreme Court. 
 For example, AAA appears to be the dominant provider of arbitration ser-
vices under employer imposed plans,283 and it has largely taken the high road, 
by requiring basic due process and employer payment of all arbitrator fees.284 
But even AAA allows employers to impose class-action waivers, and there is 
strong evidence that avoiding class actions is now the primary reason employ-
ers mandate arbitration.285 
 The cost to an employer, bank, telecommunications company, or other 
dominant party of not adhering to AAA standards is that the AAA will likely 
decline to administer the arbitration. Under developing case law, the odds are 
good that if AAA declines the case, a court will simply appoint a different arbi-
trator under section 5 of the FAA.286 Even with the demise of NAF, there is not 
likely to be a shortage of low-road arbitrators to oblige the desires of dominant 
parties.287 
 Furthermore, there seems to be little legal disincentive to prevent dominant 
parties from drafting extremely one-sided arbitration provisions. Much of the 
law of unconscionability is likely preempted after Concepcion and Italian Col-
ors, and the Court’s grant of certiorari in Zaborowski suggested it was poised to 
hold that the FAA mandates that courts reform unconscionable arbitration pro-
visions rather than deny enforcement of arbitration mandates. Such a holding 
would invite even more overreaching because an overreaching party would 
have very little to lose. If the overreaching party lost a court fight, it would still 
be able to compel arbitration under the terms reformed by the court. 
  Italian Colors and Concepcion were both five-four decisions; both were 
written by Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia’s passing deprives the Court of its most 
forceful advocate for protecting the already powerful who exploit adhesive ar-
bitration mandates. This leaves a four-four split on the Court with respect to 
most arbitration issues. The best hope for restoring this shattered vision of arbi-
283  See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1314 n.31. 
284  AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT: ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES 9, 33–35 (2016), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/AD 
RSTG_004362&revision=latestreleased [https://perma.cc/NBE7-YY62]. 
285  See Sternlight supra note 5, at 1310; see also ARBITRATION 2012, OUTSIDE IN: HOW THE
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT IS SHAPING ARBITRATION 252 (Nancy Kauffman & Matthew M. 
Franckiewicz, eds., 2013) (stating remarks of Paul J. Yechout, in-house counsel for United 
Health Group, to the National Academy of Arbitrators 2012 Annual Meeting that one of the 
primary reasons his company mandates arbitration of all employment disputes is to eliminate 
class actions). 
286  See supra Part II.C. 
287  See Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 4 (reporting that an arbitrator who found a 
nursing home not responsible for the murder of one of its residents by the resident’s room-
mate had decided 400 other cases involving the same nursing home). 
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tration as an accessible forum with advantages for both parties to arbitration 
agreements is for Justice Scalia’s successor to tip the balance back to Phase I.288 
288  The Court may soon have an opportunity to retreat from the sweeping nature of the poli-
cy favoring enforcing arbitration agreements in accordance with their terms exemplified by 
Concepcion and Italian Colors. Petitions for certiorari have been filed in four cases concern-
ing the validity of the NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton. Patterson v. Raymours Furniture 
Co., No. 15-2820-ev, 2016 WL 4598542 (2d Cir. Sept. 14, 2016), petition for cert. filed No. 
16-388 (Sept. 22, 2016); Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. Aug. 22,
2016), petition for cert. filed No. 16-300 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2016); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed No. 16-285 (U.S. Sept. 2, 2016); Murphy
Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed No. 16-307
(U.S. Sept. 9, 2016).
